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A Long View of the Senate’s Influence over
Supreme Court Appointments
Christine Kexel Chabot*
This Article offers the first empirical analysis of the Senate’s role in constraining
presidents’ choices of Supreme Court nominees over an extended historical period. It
considers ideologies of Senates faced by nominating presidents and measures whether the
ideologies of these Senates predict Justices’ voting behavior. The analysis substantially
qualifies earlier understandings of senatorial constraint.
Earlier empirical studies consider only limited numbers of recent nominees. They suggest
that the Senate has constrained presidents’ choices, and many scholars theorize that the
Senate has enhanced its role in the appointments process since the 1950s. Analysis of a
larger group of nominees shows that the Senate’s ideology has had significant predictive
power over Justices’ votes in only two isolated historical periods. Senatorial ideology was
last significant in the 1970s, shortly after the filibuster of Abe Fortas’s nomination to be
Chief Justice, but then it lost significance following rejection of Robert Bork’s nomination
in 1987.

* Visiting Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. I thank Matthew Sag,
David Schwartz, Carolyn Shapiro, and Spencer Weber Waller, as well as participants in the 2011
Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Loyola Constitutional Law Colloquium, and Loyola and
Chicago-Kent faculty workshops for their helpful comments.
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Introduction
Supreme Court Justices sometimes disappoint their appointing
presidents, and opposing-party Senates are often blamed for presidents’
1
“mistakes.” This Article offers the first empirical analysis of the Senate’s

1. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 Va. L.
Rev. 1045, 1069–70 (2001) (blaming the Senate for Eisenhower’s “mistake” in appointing Justice
Brennan and noting that Justices “tend to reflect the vector sum of political forces at the time of their
confirmation”); Lori A. Ringhand, In Defense of Ideology: A Principled Approach to the Supreme
Court Confirmation Process, 18 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 131, 157–58 (2009) (“Many of the examples
of ‘disappointed’ presidents . . . can be traced directly to a president’s need to compromise with an
ideologically hostile Senate.”).
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role in constraining presidents’ choices of Supreme Court nominees over
an extended historical period. It considers ideologies of Senates faced by
nominating presidents and measures whether these ideologies predict
Justices’ voting behavior.
The Constitution authorizes the Senate to provide “Advice and
2
Consent” on presidential nominees but does not resolve controversy over
3
the Senate’s proper role. There are many open questions about the
4
Senate’s ability to constrain presidential nominees. Beyond rejecting a
minority of nominees, has the Senate generally forced presidents to
nominate Justices who reflect the Senate’s ideology? Or has the Senate by
5
and large deferred to presidential choices? And has the Senate always
played a significant role, or has it aggrandized its position only after recent
6
events, such as Robert Bork’s failed confirmation?
To illustrate how the Senate may constrain presidents’ choices,
contrast the recent experiences of President George W. Bush with those of
Presidents George H. W. Bush and Gerald Ford. Both of the second Bush
administration’s appointees, Justices John Roberts and Samuel Alito, were
7
nominated when Republicans enjoyed a strong majority in the Senate.
Roberts and Alito vote with one another at a relatively high rate, and they
are generally thought to align with their nominating president’s policy
8
preferences. Roberts and Alito also vote with appointees of other
2. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
3. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Appointments Process: A Constitutional and
Historical Analysis 135 (2000) (“[T]he Senate’s formal authority in the appointments process has
never been as clear as that of the president.”).
4. The Senate’s constraint on the president’s choice of nominee may be described as part of the
“silent operation” of the confirmation process. Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Advice and
Consent: The Politics of Judicial Appointments 21 (2005) (citing The Federalist No. 76, at 456
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
5. See Tonja Jacobi, The Impact of Positive Political Theory on Old Questions of Constitutional
Law and the Separation of Powers, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 259, 276 (2006) (raising the question); Geoffrey
R. Stone, Understanding Supreme Court Confirmations, 2010 Sup. Ct. Rev. 381, 396 n.32 (postulating
that Senators confirm most Justices because they “usually defer to the president in terms of judicial
philosophy,” or because “presidents generally are careful to choose nominees whom the Senate is
likely to confirm”). Stone notes that it is difficult to measure the Senate’s influence on the president’s
choice if the issue is cast purely in terms of nominees that the president did not select. Id. Here, I
measure whether the president has been forced to select nominees who reflect the Senate’s ideology.
6. See Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, Advice & Dissent: The Struggle to Shape the
Federal Judiciary 7–10 (2009) (summarizing two competing theories of the appointments process,
“big bang” versus “nothing-new-under-the-sun”); Benjamin Wittes, Confirmation Wars: Preserving
Independent Courts in Angry Times 15–36 (2006).
7. Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, U.S. Senate, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/
history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (listing numbers of Senate seats
controlled by each party for all Congresses); Supreme Court Nominations, Present–1789, U.S. Senate,
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2013)
(providing dates of nominations).
8. Christine Kexel Chabot & Benjamin Remy Chabot, Mavericks, Moderates, or Drifters?
Supreme Court Voting Alignments, 1838–2009, 76 Mo. L. Rev. 999, 1017 tbl.1 (2011). Roberts’
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Republican presidents much more often than they vote with Democratic
9
appointees.
The George H.W. Bush and Ford administrations fared worse when
nominating Justices to liberal, opposing-party Senates. Bush chose David
10
Souter as a “safe” nominee in terms of his ability to win confirmation, but
11
Souter turned out to be much more liberal than Bush. Souter voted with
Bush’s other appointee, Clarence Thomas, in a relatively low percentage
12
of cases. And while Thomas votes with Republican appointees at a high
13
rate, Souter voted with Democratic appointees at an even higher rate.
Ford obtained a similar result when he nominated a known “moderate,”
14
John Paul Stevens, to an “overwhelmingly Democratic Senate.” Once on
the bench, Justice Stevens voted with Democratic appointees much more
15
than he voted with fellow Republican appointees.
Souter’s and Stevens’ voting records suggest that the Senate may
constrain presidents’ ability to nominate ideologically compatible
16
Justices. Their voting patterns reflect the ideologies of Senates faced by
nominating presidents rather than the ideologies of nominating presidents
themselves. Is there any reason to think these examples are part of a larger
pattern of senatorial constraint? If so, one would expect to see evidence in
voting records for a larger set of Justices.
To date, there have been a handful of empirical studies addressing the
Senate’s role in shaping presidents’ choices of Supreme Court nominees.
Byron Moraski and Charles Shipan’s leading study considers twenty-eight
17
persons nominated to the Supreme Court from 1949 to 1994. They find
surprising vote in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius may be explained as a
departure from his generally conservative voting record. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). Or it may reflect the
fact that the Republican party and President Bush’s outlooks on health care policy in 2005, when
Roberts was appointed, diverge from the Republican party’s current take on this issue. See Mark
Tushnet, Being “Good” at Picking Judges, Balkanization (July 7, 2012), http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2012/07/being-good-at-picking-judges.html.
9. Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at 1019 tbl.2.
10. George Watson & John A. Stookey, Shaping America: The Politics of Supreme Court
Appointments 63 (1995).
11. “[T]he first president Bush’s selection of Justice Souter highlight[s] the risk that agents can
deviate from the policy preferences of their principals.” Harold J. Krent, Presidential Powers 25
(2005); see Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Next Justice: Repairing the Supreme Court
Appointments Process 133 (2007).
12. Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at 1017 tbl.1.
13. Id. at 1019 tbl.2.
14. Epstein & Segal, supra note 4, at 21; David Alistair Yalof, Pursuit of Justices:
Presidential Politics and the Selection of Supreme Court Nominees 175 (1999) (noting that Ford
“settled” on Stevens, a “moderate noncontroversial jurist of unquestioned credentials”).
15. Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at 1019 tbl. 2.
16. See Ringhand, supra note 1, at 157–58 (arguing that Bush’s nomination of Souter “can be
traced directly” to his “need to compromise with an ideologically hostile Senate”).
17. Bryon J. Moraski & Charles R. Shipan, The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory
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that presidents nominate ideologically compatible Justices when they are
18
unconstrained by the Senate. Constrained presidents, however, nominate
Justices closer to the Senate’s ideology than the president would otherwise
19
prefer. Christine Nemacheck reaches a similar conclusion by comparing
characteristics of thirty-nine actual nominees to those of 240 potential
20
nominees from 1930 to 2005. She finds that presidents choose less
ideologically proximate candidates when they face an opposing-party
21
Senate.
These studies suggest that the Senate constrains presidents’ choices,
but limited data forced the authors to consider only small numbers of
nominees from relatively recent time periods. They also evaluate outcomes
based on candidates’ perceived ideology at the time of nomination, rather
22
than what they do once they are on the bench.
Analysis based on voting records for a larger sample of Justices calls
the Senate’s ability to constrain presidents’ choices of nominees into
doubt. My recent historical study, Mavericks, Moderates, or Drifters,
23
considers voting records for eighty-nine Justices over a 172-year period.
It finds that just under half of these Justices voted with appointees of the
24
other party most of the time. Senatorial constraint does not explain
these independent voting patterns: Presidents did not appoint a greater
percentage of ideologically incompatible Justices when they faced an
25
opposing-party Senate.
This historical analysis raises significant questions about the Senate’s
actual role. It relies only on count data, partisan measures of presidential
and senatorial ideology, and a single cumulative voting record for each
26
Justice. These are all rough metrics. They may miss underlying
relationships or senatorial influence occurring only in a limited, recent
time period.
What is needed, then, is the more precise empirical analysis offered
by this Article. It improves on earlier studies of recent nominees by
considering actual voting behavior of seventy Justices appointed since
of Institutional Constraints and Choices, 43 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 1069 (1999).
18. Id. at 1077 fig.3.
19. Id.
20. Christine L. Nemacheck, Strategic Selection: Presidential Nomination of Supreme Court
Justices from Herbert Hoover Through George W. Bush 119 (2007).
21. Id. at 129.
22. Lee Epstein and Carol Mershon point out that the leading measure of perceived ideology
used in Moraski and Shipan’s study, the Segal-Cover score, does not account for Justices’ votes in
cases other than civil liberties or votes cast “over the course of an individual’s career.” Lee Epstein &
Carol Mershon, Measuring Political Preferences, 40 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 261, 282, 284 (1996).
23. Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at 1019 tbl.2.
24. Id. at 1011 fig.2.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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1862. Furthermore, my regression analysis builds on earlier historical work
by evaluating relationships among fine-grained measures of voting
behavior and presidential and senatorial ideology.
The measure of voting behavior used in this study is paired agreement
27
rates. These rates account for every agreement or disagreement between
virtually every pair of Justices who sat together in 7520 non-unanimous
28
cases decided over a 147-year period. This study also uses leading
measures of presidential and senatorial ideology reported in Lee Epstein
29
et al.’s U.S. Supreme Court Justices Database. Political scientist Keith
Poole and his co-authors developed these measures, which are known as
30
DW-NOMINATE Scores. They account for varied “ideological
31
intensity” among presidents or Senators of the same party and have been
found to “outperform” the party of an appointing president as a predictor
32
of judicial behavior.
My analysis facilitates more careful understanding of the relationship
between Justices’ voting behavior and the Senates that confirm them. It is
also uniquely well situated to identify the Senate’s role in distinct
historical and contemporary periods.
Part I describes earlier scholarship evaluating the Senate’s
constraint and theorizes about how the Senate’s role may have changed
over time. Part II provides empirical analysis of the relationships among
the Justices’ agreement rates, the ideologies of the Justices’ nominating
presidents, and the Senates faced by these presidents.
27. These rates reflect the percentage of times two Justices agreed in a majority or minority vote
on the judgment of non-unanimous cases. Justice Alito, for example, agreed with Justice Roberts 87%
of the time, while he agreed with Justice Stevens only 44% of the time. Measuring Justices’ behavior
based on paired agreement rates is a time-honored metric. Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What
Is Judicial Ideology, and How Should We Measure It?, 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 133, 163 (2009)
(discussing paired agreement rates used in C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion Among Justices
of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1939–1941, 35 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 890 (1941)). Paired agreement rates also
reflect the same information contained in another leading measure of judicial ideology, Martin-Quinn
scores. See Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at 1011 fig.2 (comparing rates of agreement to MartinQuinn scores, as described in Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation
via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 Pol. Analysis 134 (2002)).
28. For a description of the data sets supporting this study, see infra Part II.A and Chabot &
Chabot, supra note 8, at 1006–08.
29. See Lee Epstein, Thomas G. Walker, Nancy Staudt, Scott Hendrickson & Jason Roberts, The
U.S. Supreme Court Justices Database, Univ. S. Cal. (2010) [hereinafter Justices Database], available at
http://epstein.usc.edu/research/justicesdata.html (documentation; variables 209 & 213).
30. See Royce Carroll et al., “Common-Space” DW-NOMINATE Scores with Bootstrapped
Standard Errors, Voteview, http://voteview.com/dwnomin_joint_house_and_senate.htm (last visited
Feb. 25, 2013). See generally Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political
Economic History of Roll Call Voting (1997).
31. Fischman & Law, supra note 27, at 174.
32. Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. Econ. & Org. 303, 306 (2007)
(describing Giles’s study).
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Taken as a whole, the data show that presidential ideology has had
statistically significant predictive power over agreement rates, while
senatorial ideology has not. The Senate’s ideology has had significant
predictive power in only two isolated historical periods. The Senate’s
ideology last gained significance around the 1970s, but it failed to
maintain significant predictive power after the Senate rejected Robert
Bork in 1987.

I. The Senate’s Role in Shaping Presidents’ Choices of Nominees
There is no shortage of commentary as to what the Senate’s role
33
should be. Studies analyzing what the Senate’s role has been have largely
34
35
focused on confirmation votes or nominees it rejected. Presidents’
Supreme Court nominees are far more likely to be rejected when they face
36
an opposing-party Senate. When placed in historical context, the Senate’s
rejections of Supreme Court nominees in the 1960s, ‘70s, and ‘80s stand
37
out only because they follow lengthy periods of unified government.
38
Analysis of rejections addresses only a minority of nominees. It
39
fails to account for the “silent operation” of the confirmation process,
or the Senate’s constraint on a president’s choice of nominee. This leaves
open two important questions with respect to the Senate’s influence over
presidents’ choices of Justices: First, has the Senate generally constrained
presidents’ choices? Second, has the Senate’s role changed over time? The
following Subparts outline earlier scholarship addressing these questions
and offer a framework for empirical analysis of the Senate’s role.
A. Has the Senate Generally Constrained Presidents’ Choices?
If presidents’ nominations are more likely to fail under divided
government, it may also be that opposing-party Senates constrain
presidents’ choices of nominees. Presidents facing an ideologically
distant Senate may secure confirmation by nominating Justices closer to

33. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Confirmation Mess: Cleaning up the Federal
Appointments Process (1994); Richard Davis, Electing Justice: Fixing the Supreme Court
Nomination Process (2005); Eisgruber, supra note 11; John O. McGinnis, The President, the Senate,
the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 Tex. L.
Rev. 633, 653 (1993); Stone, supra note 5, at 646–66; David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate,
the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 Yale L.J. 1491, 1493–94 (1992).
34. Moraski & Shipan, supra note 17, at 1070 (summarizing studies of confirmation votes).
35. See Stone, supra note 5, at 382–83; Keith E. Whittington, Presidents, Senates, and Failed
Supreme Court Nominations, 2006 Sup. Ct. Rev. 401, 412 (2006).
36. Stone, supra note 5, at 383 (“[T]he likelihood that a nomination will fail is much greater when
the president faces a Senate controlled by the opposition party.”).
37. Id. at 383.
38. Supreme Court Nominations, supra note 7.
39. See supra note 4.
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the Senate’s ideology than the president would otherwise prefer. Past
studies suggest that the Senate constrains presidents’ choices in these
circumstances.
Moraski’s and Shipan’s leading study observes that presidents are
better able to appoint ideologically compatible Justices when they are
40
unconstrained by the Senate. Moraski and Shipan model a president’s
choice of nominee as part of a “nomination game” in which presidents
41
take “into account” the Senate’s “preferences.” The game begins when
a vacancy occurs on the Court. The president’s nomination is the second
stage of the game, and the Senate’s confirmation decision is the final
42
stage of the game.
Moraski and Shipan assume that the president wants to nominate a
Justice who will “move the median of the Court as close as possible” to
43
the president’s own ideology. However, because presidents have a
“strong incentive” to nominate someone who will be confirmed by the
Senate, presidents select only the nominee who will “produce the best
44
new median and who will also be approved by the Senate.”
They posit that presidents are unconstrained when the president and
Senate fall on the same side as the Court’s median and the president is
45
closest to the Court’s median. Moraski and Shipan expect unconstrained
46
presidents to nominate Justices who share their own ideology. Presidents
are semi-constrained when the Senate is closer to the Court’s median than
the president, and they are fully constrained when the Senate and
47
president are on opposite sides of the Court’s median. In both of these
cases, Moraski and Shipan’s study hypothesizes that presidents will be
forced to nominate Justices closer to the Senate’s ideal point than they
48
would otherwise prefer.
Moraski and Shipan test whether these different levels of senatorial
constraint predict ideology in a group of twenty-eight persons nominated
49
to the Court from 1949 to 1994. They measure nominees’ ideology using
50
Segal-Cover scores, which are leading ideological measures based on
content analysis of “newspaper editorials written between the time of

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Moraski & Shipan, supra note 17, at 1077 fig.2.
Id. at 1071.
They model a single period rather than a repeated game. Id. at 1071–72.
Id. at 1073.
Id. at 1074.
Id. at 1075.
Id. at 1075–76.
Id. at 1076–77.
Id.
Id. at 1078.
Id. at 1074.
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[J]ustices’ nomination to the Court and their confirmation.” Thus the
appointment’s outcome, or the liberal or conservative nature of the
president’s choice of nominee, is reflected by Segal-Cover scores. The
study evaluates whether the appointments outcomes reflected by these
52
scores are better explained by the president’s or the Senate’s ideology.
Eighteen of the nominations in the study were made by unconstrained
53
presidents. Three (Stevens, Bork, and Kennedy) were made by semiconstrained presidents, and seven (Clark, Minton, Harlan, Souter, Thomas,
54
and both Fortas nominations) were made by fully constrained presidents.
Moraski and Shipan find that the ideology of unconstrained presidents
55
significantly predicts the nominees’ ideology. This relationship vanishes
56
for nominees where the president is semi- or fully constrained. And when
the president is fully constrained and disagrees with the Senate
57
“completely about the ideological direction the Court should take,” the
58
president accommodates the Senate. That is, fully constrained presidents
nominate Justices closer to the Senate’s ideal point (and the Court’s
59
median) than they would otherwise prefer.

51. Epstein & Mershon, supra note 22, at 264.
52. Moraski & Shipan, supra note 17, at 1078–79. They primarily use earlier political science
measures known as ADA scores as proxies for senatorial and presidential ideology. Id. at 1079.
Because the Senate is a multi-member body, the study measures its ideology using an ideology score
for the median member of the Senate. Id. at 1079. If all Senators are ranked from most liberal to most
conservative, the “median is the case in the middle of the distribution . . . such that . . . half the
senators are to the ideological right of the median and half are to the ideological left.” See Lee Epstein
et al., Codebook: U.S. Supreme Court Justices Database 97 (2010) [hereinafter Codebook].
53. Moraski & Shipan, supra note 17, at 1082 tbl.2.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1081–84, 1083 tbl.3.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1076, 1077 fig.3. Moraski and Shipan do not find that the Senate’s indifference point
significantly predicts nominees’ ideology when the president is semi-constrained. Id. This result is not
surprising given that only three nominees fall into this category.
58. Id. at 1083–84, 1083 tbl.3.
59. Id. Another study considering twenty-eight nominees suggests that the Senate may not
constrain presidents if senatorial ideology is measured according to the filibuster pivot rather than the
median member of the Senate. Timothy R. Johnson & Jason M. Roberts, Pivotal Politics, Presidential
Capital, and Supreme Court Nominations, 32 Congress & Presidency 31 (2005). I ran a separate
regression to account for the possibility that filibusters may lead presidents to select Justices closer to
the filibuster pivot (currently the sixtieth most liberal or conservative Senator) than to the median
Senator. As reported in Appendix A infra p. 1270 fig.6, this alternative measure also fails to identify
significant predictive power over Justices’ votes. Other studies have found ideologies of home-state
Senators to predict voting behavior of district and appellate court judges, due to the practice of
senatorial courtesy. See, e.g., Fischman & Law, supra note 27, at 173–74 n.22 (discussing studies);
Micheal W. Giles et al., Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas,
54 Pol. Res. Q. 623, 635–37 (2001). Senatorial courtesy is not understood to play as significant a role
across all Supreme Court appointments. See Epstein & Segal, supra note 4, at 22–23 (noting that, unlike
Senators from states where there is a district court or court of appeals vacancy, “senators do not expect to
have much of a say in the . . . nomination” of Supreme Court Justices); Giles et al., supra, at 628.
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Likewise, Nemacheck analyzed whether presidents choose less
ideologically proximate candidates when facing an opposing-party Senate.
Her study considered presidents’ choices of thirty-nine Justices out of a
60
group of 240 potential nominees from 1930 to 2005. Nemacheck
measured the ideology of appointing presidents based on rankings
61
developed by Poole et al. To craft a comparable measure of ideology
for her pool of potential nominees, Nemacheck turned to measures
reflecting the ideology of elite members of the candidate’s political party
62
from the candidate’s home state.
Looking to these proxies for ideologies of all potential nominees,
Nemacheck found that presidents preferred “ideologically proximate
63
candidates” when selecting actual nominees. When presidents faced an
opposing-party Senate, however, “ideological proximity [did] not have a
64
significant effect” on presidents’ choice of nominees.
These studies find that the Senate constrains presidents’ choices, but
they are based on the perceived ideologies of small numbers of appointees.
Perceived ideologies are fixed at the time of appointment and thus do not
65
reflect Justices’ actual behavior in subsequent years on the bench. The
Segal-Cover scores used by Morsaki and Shipan may also fail to reflect
66
Justices’ votes involving issues other than civil liberties. And analysis
based on small samples of individual Justices may not offer an accurate
estimate of the Senate’s role, even during the time periods covered.
My 2011 study, Mavericks, Moderates, or Drifters, calls the Senate’s
67
constraint into doubt. Historical voting records for eighty-nine Justices
over a 172-year period show that just under half of these Justices voted
68
with appointees of the other party most of the time. Senatorial
constraint does not explain their independent voting patterns. Presidents

60. Nemacheck, supra note 20, at 119, 126 tbl.6.3.
61. Id. at 119–20.
62. Nemacheck assumed a same-party member of a state’s Congressional delegation represented
the views of that party’s political elites, and thus Supreme Court candidates, within a given state.
Nemacheck, supra note 20, at 120. Poole’s ideological scores rank all members of Congress from
liberal to conservative on a scale of -1 to +1. Id. Nemacheck used this ranking to identify the score for
the median member of the group of “same party members of Congress from the candidate’s state.” Id.
at 120. If a candidate had served in Congress and had his or her own DW-NOMINATE score,
Nemacheck used that score instead. Id.
63. Id. at 129.
64. Id.
65. Epstein & Mershon, supra note 22, at 282.
66. Id. at 284.
67. Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at 1019 tbl.2.
68. Id.
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appoint about the same percentage of ideologically incompatible Justices
69
no matter which party controls the Senate.
This finding, however, does not definitively foreclose results of
studies based on contemporary appointments. Perhaps the Senate plays a
significant role, but only recently and in the limited time periods covered
by other studies. The Justice-level, cumulative voting records used in
Mavericks, Moderates, or Drifters offer only limited ability to identify
70
changes in the Senate’s role over time. For example, recent divided
government appointments such as Justices Anthony Kennedy and David
Souter may give some reason to think the Senate has enhanced its role
post-Bork. Kennedy sided moderately with Justices appointed by the same
71
party; Souter sided strongly with Justices appointed by the other party.
But it is difficult to tell whether things have changed based only on
72
cumulative voting records for eight Justices appointed since that time.
This study builds on earlier historical work by addressing both the
Senate’s general influence over appointments and measuring how its role
may have changed over time.
B. Has the Senate’s Role Changed over Time?
Past empirical studies do not adequately address the Senate’s
historical role. They lack either historical data or analysis designed to
pinpoint the Senate’s influence in discrete historical time periods. Thus,
they fail to account for the Senate’s role following early twentieth-century
73
events such as the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, the
74
controversial confirmation hearings of Louis Brandeis, and the Senate’s
75
frequent rejection of nominees in the nineteenth century. And without an
adequate understanding of the Senate’s historical role, these studies fail to

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.; see Ringhand, supra note 1, at 158 (asserting that the first President Bush and President
Reagan “needed to take senatorial preferences into account” when selecting Souter and Kennedy).
72. Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at 1020–21 (noting that a “small sample” of Justices limits the
ability to assess change in recent time periods). The study considered appointments through Justice
Sonia Sotomayor. Id. at 1017 tbl.1. Of course, voting records may not reflect some instances where the
Senate compelled presidents to moderate their choices to a lesser degree. President Bill Clinton, for
example, wanted to nominate Justices more liberal than Steven Breyer or Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
Davis, supra note 33, at 158; see Mark Silverstein, Judicious Choices: The New Politics of Supreme
Court Confirmations 170–71 (1994) (stating that Ginsburg was not the “homerun” nominee Clinton
had hoped for). Clinton moderated his choices to avoid a confirmation battle with the Senate. Once on
the bench, however, Ginsburg and Breyer sided with other Democratic nominees. See Chabot &
Chabot, supra note 8, at 1019 tbl.2. Thus, despite his moderation, Clinton basically got what he wanted
from his appointees. See Epstein & Segal, supra note 4, at 132.
73. U.S. Const. amend. XVII.
74. Epstein & Segal, supra note 4, at 1–2.
75. Whittington, supra note 35, at 413–14; Supreme Court Nominations, supra note 7.
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provide a baseline from which to evaluate the modern appointments
process.
Still, scholars offer competing theories as to whether and when the
Senate’s role changed. Some scholars contend that there has been no
“wholesale change” in an appointments process that “is and always has
76
been political.” The Senate has a long history of contesting presidents’
Supreme Court nominees. It frequently rejected nominees in the
77
nineteenth century. Keith Whittington describes the postbellum period as
one characterized by “political infighting,” “patronage politics,” and
“pitched battles” between presidents and Senators attempting to “control
78
the appointment power.”
Although the Senate stopped rejecting nominees as frequently by the
beginning of the twentieth century, it may still have played a significant
role. Lee Epstein and Jeffrey Segal point to the raging “confirmation
battle” over Woodrow Wilson’s 1916 nomination of Louis Brandeis as
79
evidence of historical conflict. Henry Abraham states that the
“confirmation battle still ranks as the most bitter and most intensely fought
80
in the history of the Court.” Thus “political clashes over candidates for
81
the Supreme Court” are anything but a “new phenomenon.”
Segal and Epstein also explain that factors associated with
aggressive confirmation hearings today—media attention and interest
group involvement—have also been present throughout history.
Brandeis, for example, was “the target of press attacks from the Wall
Street Journal and the New York Times, among others, which deemed him
82
a dangerous ‘radical.’” And in 1930, “labor and civil rights groups sent
telegram after telegram to Senators urging them to vote against” nominee
83
John Parker. Parker, who was nominated by Herbert Hoover, stands
out as the only Supreme Court nominee to be rejected by the Senate in
84
the first half of the twentieth century.
Other scholars posit enhanced politicization of the appointments
process and a pronounced shift in the Senate’s role at some point in the
latter part of the twentieth century. They offer competing theories as to

76. Epstein & Segal, supra note 4, at 4.
77. Whittington, supra note 35, at 413–14; Supreme Court Nominations, supra note 7.
78. Whittington, supra note 35, at 430.
79. Epstein & Segal, supra note 4, at 1–2.
80. Henry J. Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and Senators: A History of the U.S. Supreme
Court Appointments from Washington to Bush II 135 (rev’d ed. 1999).
81. Epstein & Segal, supra note 4, at 1–2.
82. Id. at 93.
83. Id. at 94–95.
84. Supreme Court Nominations, supra note 7.

May 2013]

INFLUENCE OVER COURT APPOINTMENTS

1241

the precise date of change. The following Subparts discuss these theories
and outline possible, concurrent changes in appointing presidents’ roles.
1.

Routine Questioning Starting in the 1950s

Benjamin Wittes asserts that “the critical shift in the confirmation
85
process began with Brown [v. Board of Education] and established a new
status quo as the Court’s aggressiveness increased over the subsequent two
86
decades.” Thus, “the first major watershed” occurred far in advance of
the Bork nomination. It occurred in response to President Dwight
87
Eisenhower’s nomination of John Marshall Harlan shortly after Brown.
The Senate’s questioning of Harlan signaled the start of its “current
practice” of requiring nominees to testify before the Judiciary Committee
88
“as a matter of course.” And unlike in the past, the Senate now used
these proceedings to “grill the nominees about individual cases or about
89
their judicial philosophies.”
Whether this immediately enhanced the Senate’s influence over
presidents’ choices of nominees is less clear. Wittes notes that the shift
90
marked by the Harlan confirmation proceedings “took place gradually.”
Senators in subsequent hearings “did not immediately push every
91
nominee to bare his soul.” Moreover, both nominees and the press
pushed back against the Senate’s initial attempts to raise questions about
92
nominees’ substantive views. Finally, while Wittes speculates this shift
may have ultimately led presidents “to satisfy the opposing party” in
their choices of nominees, he does not provide any examples of
93
presidents doing so immediately after Harlan’s confirmation.
2.

Enhanced Political Pressure and the Filibuster in the Late 1960s

Other scholars assert that the Senate’s role changed at later dates.
Mark Silverstein posits that a “New Political Calculus” for confirmations
94
emerged in the late 1960s. By this time, “politically powerful groups”
were “willing to invest substantial time and resources in the battle to

85. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
86. Wittes, supra note 6, at 60.
87. Id.
88. Stone, supra note 5, at 427; see Gerhardt, supra note 3, at 68; Wittes, supra note 6, at 61.
89. Wittes, supra note 6, at 61.
90. Id. at 69–70.
91. Id. at 69.
92. Id. at 67–69, 91 (describing evasive responses given by Harlan and William Brennan, as well
as editorial criticisms of Senate’s questioning appearing in the New York Times and the Washington Post).
93. Id. at 92.
94. Silverstein, supra note 72, at 154.
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95

control the judiciary.”
Formal interest group participation in
96
confirmation hearings became a staple after the Fortas filibuster in 1968.
In addition, the “erosion of the old Senate norms” increased
incentives for individual Senators to play a more active role in
97
confirmation decisions. Senators now operated under new norms where it
was no longer safe to “simply conform to the expectations of peers and
98
accept the president’s choice.” Instead, every Senator now faced
significant electoral consequences in voting “for or against a particular
99
nominee.”
The Senate may have assumed a greater role in appointments in the
wake of these enhanced political pressures. Richard Davis states that
calls “for Senate assertiveness in the nomination process began with
Republican Senators during the unsuccessful confirmation effort for Abe
100
Fortas as chief justice in 1968.”
Silverstein contends that the Senate’s failure to confirm Fortas as
Chief Justice in 1968 “signaled an important shift . . . in the process of
101
appointing Supreme Court justices.” Although Fortas was nominated at
the end of Lyndon Johnson’s term as president, the nomination
102
originally appeared to be a “sure thing.” Fortas had easily been
103
confirmed by the Senate as an Associate Justice three years earlier.
However, “Johnson’s fabled mastery and control of the legislative
104
process evaporated in an astonishing series of events.”
The Senate Judiciary Committee grilled Fortas about his role as
adviser to the president, as well as the ideological direction of the Warren
105
Court. Although the Judiciary Committee voted to report favorably on
Fortas’ nomination, the nomination was filibustered when it reached the
106
Fortas was the first nominee who failed to gain
Senate floor.
confirmation since John Parker in 1930 and only the second failed
107
The Fortas
Supreme Court nominee in the twentieth century.

95. Id.
96. Nemacheck, supra note 20, at 48 (citing Jeffrey A. Segal et al., A Spatial Model of Roll Call
Voting: Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations,
36 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 96 (1992)).
97. Silverstein, supra note 72, at 154.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Davis, supra note 33, at 20–21.
101. Silverstein, supra note 72, at 12.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 11–12.
104. Id. at 11.
105. Id. at 24–25.
106. Id. at 27.
107. Supreme Court Nominations, supra note 7.
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nomination marked the first time the Senate used the filibuster to oppose a
108
Supreme Court nominee.
The pattern of opposition continued after Richard Nixon took
office. Although the Senate approved Richard Nixon’s nomination of
Warren Burger as Chief Justice, it went on to reject Nixon’s nominations
109
of Clement Haynsworth, Jr. and G. Harrold Carswell.
Silverstein contends that this politicized confirmation process
changed modern presidents’ incentives with respect to Supreme Court
110
nominations. It was no longer sufficient to choose Justices based on
111
“excellence on the bench.” Instead, presidents would now be “compelled
to seek out nominees” with characteristics that would minimize political
112
opposition to their confirmation.
Silverstein focuses on how this political pressure appears to have
shaped nomination decisions in the Reagan and first Bush
113
administrations. But the changed confirmation environment also may
have influenced earlier presidents. When nominating a Justice in the
wake of the Haynsworth and Carswell rejections, for example, Nixon
114
ended up choosing a “moderate conservative,” Harry Blackmun. And
when Gerald Ford faced an “overwhelmingly Democratic Senate,” he
115
chose a known “moderate,” John Paul Stevens.
3.

Borking Bork in 1987

For some observers, the critical shift in the Senate’s role was its
politically charged rejection of Robert Bork, who was Ronald Reagan’s
116
third nominee to the Supreme Court. Ideology clearly played a key role

108. Davis, supra note 33, at 79; Epstein & Segal, supra note 4, at 24.
109. Supreme Court Nominations, supra note 7.
110. Silverstein, supra note 72, at 100.
111. Id. Silverstein suggests that enhanced political pressure may also make it more difficult for
presidents to nominate Justices of great professional stature. Id. at 160–62 (indicating that today’s
more democratic process may make it more difficult to nominate Justices of “talent” and “distinction”
similar to that of Thurgood Marshall, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis, and Charles Evans
Hughes). Other scholars suggest that enhanced political pressure may have the opposite effect: It may
lead presidents to nominate Justices who have impeccable professional credentials. Stone, supra note
5, at 410–14 (proposing that “highly qualified” nominees may have an easier time overcoming
senatorial opposition). This study does not attempt to measure professional qualifications of
presidents’ nominees.
112. Silverstein, supra note 72, at 100.
113. For example, he describes Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter as
“stealth” candidates whose unknown political views helped them win confirmation. Id. at 164. He also
describes Clarence Thomas as a nominee whose known conservatism was offset by the racial and
socioeconomic diversity he would bring to the Court. Id. at 99.
114. Id. at 108–09.
115. Epstein & Segal, supra note 4, at 21; Yalof, supra note 14, at 175 (stating that Ford “settled”
on Stevens, a “moderate noncontroversial jurist of unquestioned credentials”).
116. John Anthony Maltese, The Selling of Supreme Court Nominees 7 (1995) (explaining that
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in rejecting Bork, a candidate whose professional and intellectual
117
credentials were beyond reproach. Bork, in particular, predicted that
the Senate’s action would force future presidents to nominate moderate
118
candidates with short paper trails. John Maltese has described Bork’s
defeat as the “watershed event that unleashed what Stephen Carter has
119
called ‘the confirmation mess.’” Many portray the Bork confirmation
process as “unprecedented . . . in terms of the breadth of involvement by
organized interests, . . . the length and detail of Bork’s public testimony
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the number of witnesses
120
appearing at the televised hearings.”
Whether this actually enhanced the Senate’s influence over
presidents’ choices is less clear. To be sure, much of the mess persists in the
121
ongoing conflict over appointments to federal circuit and district courts.
With respect to the Supreme Court, it seems to have constrained Reagan
and George H.W. Bush in their next two official nominations of Kennedy
122
and Souter. But then Bush successfully nominated Clarence Thomas for
123
confirmation by a liberal Senate. Since that time, presidents have
appointed a string of ideologically compatible Justices, but they have not
124
faced opposing-party Senates.

the Bork confirmation process was “unprecedented” in terms of interest group involvement and
nature of hearings); Wittes, supra note 6, at 21 (noting one argument that the “watershed event” in
changing the appointments process “was the fight over the Bork nomination in 1987” in which the
Senate rejected Bork); Yalof, supra note 14, at 189 (“Bork’s ill-fated Supreme Court bid in 1987
fundamentally changed the nature of public discourse that would surround all future Supreme Court
appointments.”); see Binder & Maltzman, supra note 6, at 7–8 (raising the same argument).
117. Silverstein, supra note 72, at 122.
118. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 347
(1990) (“A president who wants to avoid a battle like mine . . . is likely to nominate men and women
who have not written much, and certainly nothing that could be regarded as controversial . . . .”); see
Stone, supra note 5, at 415.
119. See Binder & Maltzman, supra note 6, at 7–8 (quoting John Anthony Maltese, Anatomy of a
Confirmation Mess: Recent Trends in the Federal Judicial Selection Process, JURIST Online
Symposium (Univ. of Pittsburgh Sch. of Law, Apr. 15, 2004), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/
Symposium-jc/Maltese.php#2); see Wittes, supra note 6, at 21.
120. Maltese, supra note 116, at 7; Yalof, supra note 14, at 160 (“The Bork nomination became a
watershed in terms of interest group involvement in the appointments process.”).
121. Sarah Binder and Forrest Maltzman describe an “acrimonious and dysfunctional”
confirmation process resulting in “declining confirmation rates and unprecedented delay” for lower
federal court judges. Binder & Maltzman, supra note 6, at 1; see id. at 3–6 figs.1-1 to 1-3 (providing
recent statistics on declining confirmation rates and increasing delays in confirming lower court
judges); Wittes, supra note 6, at 38–39 (same).
122. Ringhand, supra note 1, at 158.
123. Party Division in the Senate, supra note 7; Supreme Court Nominations, supra note 7.
124. Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at 1019 tbl.2.
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Some scholars contend the Bork nomination was actually the
Senate’s undoing. The problem may be that the Bork confirmation
hearings were too successful. As described by Christopher Eisgruber:
The Bork nomination changed the way that confirmation hearings
proceed. Never again will a nominee with an extreme or controversial
judicial philosophy answer questions as candidly as Bork did. In that
125
sense, the Bork hearings . . . were a success that cannot be repeated.

Thus, the Senate’s success in rejecting Bork on ideological grounds gave
future nominees tremendous incentives to avoid candid discussion of their
ideological views. As described by then-professor Elena Kagan, the Bork
hearings were a one-time event that has turned subsequent confirmation
126
testimony into nothing more than a “vapid and hollow charade.”
If the Bork debacle undermined the Senate’s effective use of
confirmation hearings, then presidents may not have felt as much pressure
to take senatorial preferences into account. They could nominate an
ideologically proximate candidate who could be coached to evade rigorous
questioning and withhold revealing answers at a confirmation hearing.
4.

Change in the President’s Role?

However, the Senate does not operate in a vacuum, and it is
important to consider whether—in the role of appointing—the president
has changed alongside the Senate. Although analysis of presidential
nomination decisions is more rare, David Yalof’s careful study of the
Supreme Court nomination process provides helpful background.
Yalof focuses on a recent period: He “relates how presidents since
World War II have selected nominees to serve on the United States
127
Supreme Court.” During this time, presidents employed a very different
set of selection strategies. For example, Harry Truman chose “close friends
128
and loyalists,” and Dwight Eisenhower tried to set himself apart from
Truman. Eisenhower adopted an “impersonal” method of selecting
129
nominees. His selection criteria focused on identifying candidates with
130
outstanding qualifications who shared his moderate political views.
But there is some reason to think that presidents also placed
enhanced political emphasis on appointments by the 1970s. Yalof notes
that in the 1970s and ‘80s, Nixon and Reagan pursued “ideological goals”
125. Eisgruber, supra note 11, at 156; Stone, supra note 5, at 435 (noting that “after the furor over
Bork had passed, subsequent nominees reverted to the safety of the traditional approach” and were
closed-mouthed about their views).
126. Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 919, 941 (1995).
127. Yalof, supra note 14, at vii.
128. Id. at 21.
129. Id. at 41.
130. Id. at 42 (citing Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Edgar N. Eisenhower (Oct. 1, 1953), in
Ann C. Whitman Files).
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131

in appointments “especially aggressively.” Nixon made the issue a
132
central part of his presidential campaign in 1968. He promised to focus
on ideology in making appointments. He blamed “the Warren Court for
civil unrest” and “promised to appoint only conservative ‘law and order’
133
judges who would strictly interpret the Constitution.” While Gerald Ford
was in too weak a position to continue this role (and Jimmy Carter did not
have an opportunity to appoint a Justice), Reagan renewed efforts to
134
appoint conservative Justices.
Still, Nixon’s and Reagan’s pursuit of ideological goals may not
indicate a change in the executive role. They were by no means the first
135
presidents to consider the ideology of nominees. Nor can one fall back
on the fact that Nixon and Reagan enjoyed bureaucratic resources
136
unavailable to many early presidents: It is unclear whether mere use of
additional staff enhanced either Nixon’s or Reagan’s appointment
137
power.
Changes in technology may have played a greater part in bolstering
presidents’ roles. By the Reagan administration, “[a]dvances in research
technology allowed the administration . . . to review the complete body of
138
Access to
judicial opinions for every jurist under consideration.”
information in computerized databases such as LexisNexis and WestLaw
“increased the amount of readily available information on candidates
139
exponentially.”
Yalof recounts that “never before” the time of President Reagan had
the selection process involved “such an excruciatingly detailed
140
examination” of potential nominees’ past writings. And the research
technology supporting this analysis remains available to subsequent
131. Eisgruber, supra note 11, at 126; Yalof, supra note 14, at 177 (noting that Nixon and Reagan
employed “‘criteria-driven’ framework” for selecting Justices).
132. Yalof, supra note 14, at 97–98.
133. Id.; see Eisgruber, supra note 11, at 126.
134. Wittes, supra note 6, at 27 (noting Reagan’s pursuit of conservative judicial appointments).
135. History books are rife with contrary examples and describe “efforts to mold the Court” that
“date from George Washington” and have “hardly abated with recent presidents.” Davis, supra note
33, at 42.
136. FDR’s administration established the Office of Legal Counsel and expanded the White House
staff. See Yalof, supra note 14, at 12–13. Earlier presidents, who had only a “weak attorney general
and Spartan White House” staff, often “sorted through” candidates “on their own.” Id. at 10.
137. Id. at 186 (stating the “adage too many cooks spoiled the broth never proved more apt” than
in the failure of “overlapping staff responsibilities” to select the best nominees for Presidents Reagan
and Nixon).
138. Id. at 17, 166 (discussing advances in legal research technology available to all “modern
participants in the appointments process”).
139. Nemacheck, supra note 20, at 20–21.
140. Yalof, supra note 14, at 144; see Nemacheck, supra note 20, at 86–87 (noting heightened
research conducted by the Reagan administration).
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administrations. The decision to choose nominees almost exclusively from
141
a pool of candidates with prior judicial experience and a body of judicial
opinions to review may have helped presidents exploit this technology to
even greater advantage.
Although presidents since Reagan placed varying levels of emphasis
142
on the ideology of nominees, with the exception of Souter they
143
generally succeeded in appointing ideologically compatible Justices.
This recent string of “successes” coincides with an enhanced ability to
scour nominees’ past writings for evidence of their ideology. It may be
that technology has enhanced presidents’ ability to appoint ideologically
compatible Justices in recent years.
C. Testable Theories
As a whole, past studies leave unresolved many important questions
about the Senate’s role. Studies based on small samples of contemporary
Justices suggest that the Senate constrains presidents’ choices of
Supreme Court nominees. But these studies fail to address whether the
Senate’s constraint has persisted or evolved historically, and whether
there is any association between the ideology of Senates to which
Justices are nominated and how Justices vote. The historical voting data
used in this study support analysis of these questions.

II. Empirical Analysis
This Part measures the relationships among Justices’ voting behavior
and ideologies of presidents and Senates at the time of nomination.
Specifically, it evaluates whether my dependent variable, Justices’ rates of
agreement, is predicted by senatorial ideology. It addresses both the
general predictive power of the Senate’s ideology and how it may have
changed over time.
A. Data
This study draws on 7520 non-unanimous cases from contemporary
144
and historical data sets to support analysis of voting records for seventy
individual Justices and 969 pairs of Justices from 1862 to 2009.
141. See generally Tracey E. George, From Judge to Justice: Social Background Theory and the
Supreme Court, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1333 (2007).
142. The first and second Bush administrations shared Reagan’s desire to appoint conservative
Justices. See Wittes, supra note 6, at 27. Although Bill Clinton and Barack Obama may have placed less
emphasis on ideology alone, they generally succeeded in appointing ideologically compatible Justices.
143. See Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at 1019 tbl.2.
144. I use 1924 non-unanimous cases from my historical data set, see Chabot & Chabot, supra note
8, at 1006–08, and 5596 non-unanimous cases from Harold J. Spaeth’s contemporary data set in Sup.
Ct. Database, http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (using the Dataset’s 2010
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B. Dependent Variable
My dependent variable is Justices’ paired rates of agreement in nonunanimous cases. This is a time-honored metric that reflects the same
information contained in a leading measure of ideology known as
145
Martin-Quinn scores.
This study calculates agreement rates in two steps. First, for each
non-unanimous case, it records whether two Justices agreed in a majority
or minority vote on a judgment. It counts votes for a majority, plurality,
or concurrence as part of the majority coalition and votes for a dissent as
part of a minority coalition.
Second, this study adds each case in which the pair agreed and
divides this number by the total number of cases in which the pair sat
together. This calculation provides a rate of agreement for each pair of
Justices who sat together.
Paired agreement rates capture differences and similarities in voting
behavior without noise that may be introduced by directional coding of
146
For example, Justice Stevens agreed with Justice
case outcomes.
Ginsburg in 76% of non-unanimous cases, while he agreed with Justice
Scalia in only 43% of non-unanimous cases. Note that it is not helpful to
include unanimous cases because they offer no additional information
about Justices’ relative positions. Stevens agrees with Scalia and Ginsburg
at the same rate in unanimous cases.
Release 02, which includes votes from 1953–2009). The historical data exclude a small percentage of
individual Justices’ votes for opinions that the Supreme Court Historical Society coded as separate
opinions or statements rather than majority, concurrence, or dissent. See Chabot & Chabot, supra note
8, at 1042 n.142. My historical time period has a smaller number of non-unanimous cases because
Justices wrote far fewer dissents and concurrences before 1925. See Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of
Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 362, 363 fig.1 (2001); Stephen C. Halpern &
Kenneth N. Vines, Institutional Disunity, the Judges’ Bill and the Role of the U.S. Supreme Court,
30 W. Pol. Q. 471, 476, 478–80 & figs.1–3 (1977).
145. This metric follows “some of the earliest empirical studies of the Supreme Court,” in which
“political scientist Herman Pritchett constructed tables showing how often each pair of Justices was in
agreement, or how often each pair dissented together.” Fischman & Law, supra note 27, at 163 (citing
C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion Among Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1939–1941,
35 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 890 (1941)). For an illustration of how it reflects the same information contained
in Martin-Quinn, see Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at 1011 fig.2 (discussing similarities between
percentages of agreement and Martin-Quinn Scores for 2009).
146. Directional coding would identify whether a Justice voted in favor of a liberal or conservative
outcome for each case. While in theory directional coding could capture the same differences or
similarities in Justices’ votes, it is difficult to identify a single, objective conservative or liberal outcome for
cases across all areas of the Court’s docket. See Fischman & Law, supra note 27, at 160–62; William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study, 1 J. Legal Analysis 775,
778–79 (2009); Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis of the
Supreme Court, 60 Hastings L.J. 477, 480, 493 (2009); Anna Harvey & Michael Woodruff, Confirmation
Bias in the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 29 J.L. Econ. & Org. 414, 415 (2013). This
study avoids judgments involved in directional coding by looking to Justices’ agreement rates alone.
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Paired agreement rates also yield a large number of observations for
regression analysis. This study uses rates of agreement for 969 pairs of
Justices who sat together over a 147-year period. These data reflect
voting behavior for seventy Justices, from Noah Swayne through Sonia
Sotomayor, and all other Justices with whom they sat. It excludes a
handful of Justices for whom no presidential ideology scores are
147
available. Although the historical data set has voting records for Justices
before Swayne, the analysis starts with Swayne because paired agreement
rates for earlier appointees are based on smaller numbers of cases.
C. Explanatory Variables
This study considers whether two explanatory variables predict
Justices’ rates of agreement. The variables are ideologies of presidents
and ideologies of median members of the Senate at the time of
148
nomination. It is important to consider both presidential and senatorial
ideology when identifying the Senate’s role. For example, it may be that
Justices’ voting patterns are completely unpredictable. Presidents may
never appoint Justices whose votes can be explained by presidential or
senatorial ideology. This would suggest that judicial independence plays
a much greater role than senatorial constraint.
If presidents have some power to predict how their appointees will
vote, however, then the Senate may constrain the presidents’ choices. If it
does, Justices’ voting behavior should reflect ideologies of Senates faced
by nominating presidents. Of course, presidents and Senates will
themselves be ideologically proximate in some cases. But this is not always
the case, and regression analysis can identify whether Justices’ voting
behavior varies according to changes in senatorial ideology. It can also
identify whether presidents generally appoint Justices who reflect their
own ideology regardless of the Senate. The Subpart below describes
measures of presidential and senatorial ideology used to support this
analysis.
This Article quantifies presidential and senatorial ideology using
leading political science metrics reported in the U.S. Supreme Court
149
Justices Database. The scores it reports for nominating presidents and
147. I exclude Justices for whom no presidential DW-NOMINATE scores are available: Cardozo,
Roberts, L.Q. Lamar, Fuller, Matthews, Woods, and Harlan. Also, I was concerned that certain pairs
had unusually high rates of agreement based on limited opportunities to agree. To correct for this I
eliminated two pairs of Justices that had a 100% agreement rate.
148. If all Senators are ranked from most liberal to most conservative, the “median is the case in
the middle of the distribution . . . such that . . . half the senators are to the ideological right of the
median and half are to the ideological left.” Codebook, supra note 52.
149. Justices Database, supra note 29 (variables 209 and 213). This database is prepared by Lee
Epstein, Thomas G. Walker, Nancy Staudt, Scott A. Hendrickson, and Jason M. Roberts, and it
documents background information for all official Supreme Court nominees.
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median members of the Senate at time of nomination are known as first
dimension, common space DW-NOMINATE scores, and they were
150
developed by Poole et al.
Poole et al.’s DW-NOMINATE scores (or an earlier variant of these
scores) have helped explain judicial behavior or identify judicial ideology
151
in several prominent studies. As explained by Lee Epstein et al., Poole’s
work in this area makes a “profound contribution . . . to the study of
152
American political institutions.” The resulting metrics account for varied
153
ideological intensity among presidents or Senators of the same party and
have been found to outperform “other common measures, such as the
154
party of the appointing President” as a predictor of judicial behavior.
The DW-NOMINATE scores rank Senators or presidents from
155
liberal to conservative on a scale of -1 to +1. They are derived from roll
call votes cast by each member of Congress and are comparable across
156
different Congresses. The scores also rank presidents in equivalent
terms, based on the positions they took on particular congressional roll call
157
votes. The first dimension coordinate of the scores used here “typically
picks up the liberal/conservative dimension of conflict in American
158
politics.” For Justices who were elevated to Chief Justice while serving as
Associate Justices, such as William Rehnquist, DW-NOMINATE scores
are used for their initial nomination to the Court.
Note that this study focuses on the ideological proximity between
the two presidents who nominated a pair of Justices, as well as the
proximity between median members of Senates faced by these
nominating presidents. To measure ideological proximity, I calculate
absolute distance between DW-NOMINATE scores for a particular pair
of Justices’ nominating presidents or Senates. This provides a metric of
how ideologically close or distant the pairs’ presidents or Senates may be.
150. Codebook, supra note 148, at 95, 97–98 (variables 209 and 213); see Carroll et al., supra note 30.
151. Epstein & Segal, supra note 4, at 131 fig.5.4 (finding Poole’s measure of appointing
presidents’ ideology to generally predict the direction of Justices’ votes in recent time periods);
Nemacheck, supra note 20, at 129 (using DW-NOMINATE score as a measure of nominating
president’s ideology and finding that unconstrained presidents select ideologically proximate Justices);
Giles et al., supra note 59, at 631 (using Poole and Rosenthal’s “first dimension common space scores
to measure the ideological preferences of the appointing president and relevant senators” and finding
that both presidential ideology and ideology of home state senator helped predict court of appeals
judges’ votes); see Frank B. Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals 166, 172–75
(2007) (using common space scores to identify median judges on panel of court of appeals judges).
152. Epstein et al., supra note 32, at 306 n.4.
153. Fischman & Law, supra note 27, at 174.
154. Epstein et al., supra note 32, at 306–07 (describing Giles’s study).
155. See Codebook, supra note 52, at 95, 97.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.

May 2013]

INFLUENCE OVER COURT APPOINTMENTS

1251

For example, Stevens and Ginsburg were nominated by
ideologically distant presidents. Ford, who nominated Stevens, has a
DW-NOMINATE score of 0.5, while Bill Clinton, who nominated
Ginsburg, has a score of -0.514. Thus, the absolute distance between
Stevens’ and Ginsburg’s nominating presidents is 1.014. But the
ideological medians of the Senates faced by Ford and Clinton were much
closer, with a score of -0.188 for Stevens and a score of -0.193 for
Ginsburg. Thus, the distance between the Senates to which Stevens and
Ginsburg were nominated is a mere 0.005.
This distance provides “SENDIST” and “PRESDIST” variables that
159
can be compared to paired agreement rates for all Justices. The variables
measure whether Justices’ rates of agreement are predicted by ideologies
of presidents or Senates at the time of their nominations. Returning to the
example above, note that Stevens and Ginsburg agreed at a high rate of
76%. This is not a result one would expect, given that they were
nominated by ideologically distant presidents. But it can be explained by
the fact that their nominating presidents faced ideologically proximate
Senates.
D. Hypotheses and Regression Analysis
This study uses regression analysis to identify the relationships among
agreement rates, ideologies of Justices’ nominating presidents, and
ideologies of Senates faced by those presidents. It may be, for example,
that Justices agree along apolitical lines that cannot be generally explained
by either ideologies of their nominating presidents or Senates faced by
these presidents. It may be that senatorial ideology predicts how Justices
vote: Justices agree more with Justices whose nominating presidents faced
ideologically similar Senates and less with Justices whose nominating
160
presidents faced ideologically distant Senates. Or presidential ideology
may predict agreement rates along similar lines.
The regression identifies not only whether senatorial or presidential
ideology predict Justices’ agreement rates, but how confident one should
be that a predictive relationship reflects something other than “mere
161
chance” or random variation in Justices’ behavior. This allows one to
159. As explained infra in Part II.E.3, regression analysis accounts for pairs of Justices whose
nominating presidents or Senates have identical scores, and thus a PRESDIST or a SENDIST of zero.
Pairs of Justices for whom PRESDIST or SENDIST is zero do not drop out of the regression, but
instead their agreement rates are compared to agreement rates of other pairs for whom PRESDIST or
SENDIST is greater than zero.
160. Justice Stevens’ voting patterns are described above. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
161. Michael O. Finkelstein, Basic Concepts of Probability and Statistics in the Law 53–54
(2009) (describing the concept of statistical significance in regression analysis). All significant results in
this study satisfy standard 1% or 5% confidence levels. Id. These levels mean that in a very high
percentage of cases (99% or 95%, respectively) the regression will correctly identify a predictive
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test a number of hypotheses about the Senate’s constraint on presidents’
choices of nominees:
(1) Holding presidents’ ideologies fixed, Justices whose nominating
presidents faced ideologically proximate Senates vote together
more often than Justices whose nominating presidents faced
ideologically distant Senates.
(2) The Senate’s ideology predicts Justices’ rates of agreement in one
or more distinct historical time periods.
(3) The Senate’s ideology predicts agreement rates of Justices
nominated from 1950–1970, or the time when the Senate adopted
its routine practice of requiring nominees to appear before the
Judiciary Committee.
(4) The Senate’s ideology predicts agreement rates of Justices
nominated from 1970–1990, or the period after it used its first-ever
filibuster against a Supreme Court nominee.
(5) The Senate’s ideology predicts agreement rates of Justices
nominated from 1990–2010, or the period after its rejection of
Robert Bork.

E. Regression Analysis
This study reports results of four regressions. The first regression
considers the general relationships among agreement rates and
162
presidential and senatorial ideology across all Justices. The second and
third regressions incorporate time dummy variables to identify whether
163
different relationships are present in distinct time periods. The last

relationship between ideology and agreement rates. Id. Other results may identify a relationship
between ideology and agreement rates, but the standard error will be too great to confidently reject
the possibility that the relationship reflects only random variation in voting patterns. Such
relationships are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
162. I estimate the following regression to measure predictive power of presidential and senatorial
ideology for agreement rates of all Justices in my study:
(Agree_Rate)i,j = i + 1*PRESDISTi,j + 2* SENDISTi,j + ,

where (Agree_Rate)i,j is the percentage of cases in which Justice i and Justice j joined the same
majority or minority coalition on the judgment, PRESDISTi,j is the absolute distance between the DWNOMINATE scores of the president that nominated Justice i and the president that nominated Justice
j, and SENDISTi,j is the absolute distance between the DW-NOMINATE scores of the median
Senators at the time of nomination for Justice i and Justice j. The intercept (i) is allowed to vary
across Justices.
163. The second and third regressions add time dummy variables to the initial regression. The
second regression (twenty-year time dummy variables) is:
(Agree_Rate)i,j = i+ 1*PRESDISTi,j + 2*(PRESDISTi,j)(1890_1910) +
3*(PRESDISTi,j)(1910_1930) + 4*(PRESDISTi,j)(1930_1950) +
5*(PRESDISTi,j)(1950_1970) + 6*(PRESDISTi,j)(1970_1990) +
7*(PRESDISTi,j)(1970_1990)+8*SENDISTi,j + 9*(SENDISTi,j)(1890_1910) +
10*(SENDISTi,j)(1910_1930) + 11*(SENDISTi,j)(1930_1950) +
12*(SENDISTi,j)(1950_1970) + 13*(SENDISTi,j)( 1970_1990) +
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regression, which is reported in Appendix A, considers whether ideologies
of Senators who represent the Senate’s filibuster pivot, rather than
ideologies of median members of the Senate, have predictive power over
164
Justices’ votes.
1.

Regression Specifications

Because the dependent variable reflects rates of agreement rather
165
than binary (0 or 1) outcomes, the study uses OLS regressions. The
regressions are multivariate, meaning that they take both explanatory
variables of senatorial ideology and presidential ideology into account. A
regression considering predictive power of presidential or senatorial
ideology alone could be misleading because it might overlook the fact
that presidential and senatorial ideology are sometimes correlated. Thus a
regression taking both factors into account can decompose the variation in
agreement rates into separate presidential and senatorial coefficients.
Coefficients identify the relationship between each explanatory variable
and agreement rates, quantifying change in agreement rates predicted by
difference in presidential or senatorial ideology.
The regressions also incorporate two additional adjustments to
account for idiosyncratic voting patterns that may vary from Justice to
Justice. First, they use fixed effect specifications to measure each Justice’s
patterns of agreement with other Justices. This accounts for different
overall levels of agreeability among different Justices. For example, Justice
Clarke agreed with all other Justices only 52% of the time, while Justice
166
Blatchford agreed with all other Justices 78% of the time. An agreement
rate of 67% might show ideological compatibility for Justice Clarke
(indeed, this was his rate of agreement with Justice Brandeis). But the
same rate might show ideological incompatibility for Justice Blatchford, as
167
he generally agreed with other Justices more than 67% of the time. Thus,

14*(SENDISTi,j)(1990_2010) +
The third regression(event time dummy variables) is:

(Agree_Rate)i,j = i + 1*PRESDISTi,j + 2*(PRESDISTi,j)(WAR_DUM) +
3*(PRESDISTi,j)(FIL_DUM) + 4*(PRESDISTi,j)(BORK_DUM) + 5*SENDISTi,j +
6*(SENDISTi,j)(WAR_DUM) + 9*(SENDISTi,j)(FIL_DUM) +
10*(SENDISTi,j)(BORK_DUM) + 

164. A table reporting coefficients and standard errors for all regressions in the study is included in
Appendix B.
165. OLS stands for “ordinary least squares.” Finkelstein, supra note 161, at 137. The OLS
regression is a linear model. Id. It identifies a line that best fits all data points and minimizes the sum
of squared differences between the line and data points. Id.
166. See Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at 1029 fig.9, 1032 fig.10.
167. Id.
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a measure based on average levels of agreeability for each Justice could be
168
far off as a measure of ideological compatibility for all Justices.
A fixed effect specification solves the problem by directing the
regression to calculate a unique starting point (or intercept) from which
169
to consider variation in each Justice’s rates of agreement. Thus, it
considers whether Clarke agreed with Brandeis more or less than he
agreed with other Justices with whom he sat, and whether Blatchford
agreed with Brown more or less than he agreed with other Justices with
whom he sat. Over these customized starting points for each Justice, the
regression fixes a uniform estimate (or coefficient) reflecting change in
agreement rates relative to changes in ideological distances between
presidents and Senates at the time of nomination.
Next, the analysis controls for the idiosyncratic voting patterns of
different Justices by computing clustered standard errors. Standard
errors are reported in all regressions and reflect how confident one can
be that the regression coefficients account for relationships identified by
all data points. Here, the data points do not reflect agreement rates for
969 unique pairs of Justices, but data points for pairs in which each
170
Justice shows up multiple times. For Alito, to illustrate, the study
considers paired voting records between Alito and Sotomayor, Alito and
Roberts, Alito and Breyer, and so on. The concern is that unobservable
factors other than presidential or senatorial ideology may influence an
individual Justice’s voting and result in errors that vary unevenly from
Justice to Justice.
If Chief Justice William Taft had an unusually rich diet that
influenced his voting behavior, for example, his votes may be more
erratic than those of his colleagues. Clustered standard errors adjust for
unobservable differences in voting behavior that vary from Justice to

168. A particular concern with comparing earlier voting records to later voting records is that the
Court’s percentages of non-unanimous decisions have increased significantly since the 1940s. Robert
Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and
Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1267, 1310 (2001). Some scholars attribute the
change to deteriorating norms of consensus on the Court. Id. This study avoids many cases affected by
changing norms of consensus by considering only non-unanimous decisions where there was no
consensus among all Justices, and if norms of consensus led earlier Justices to higher overall levels of
agreeability even in non-unanimous cases, the fixed effect specification controls for this difference.
169. I included the fixed effect specification by hand coding binary fixed effect dummy variables
and adding them to the data used in the regression.
170. Clustered standard errors adjust for heteroskedasticity, or the possibility of uneven variance
in unobservable factors for each Justice. Code to calculate clustered standard errors on a fixed effect
regression in MATLAB is described in Ian D. Gow et al., Correcting for Cross-Sectional and TimeSeries Dependence in Accounting Research, 85 Acct. Rev. 483, 495 n.7 (2010). For more information
on this technique, see id. I coded data for this regression in Excel, converted it to a text file, and then
ran regressions on the text files using MATLAB.
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Justice. They group standard errors around changes in agreement rates
for each individual Justice, rather than lumping all errors together and
considering them with respect to changes in agreement rates across all
Justices in the study. This specification requires the data to pass a more
difficult test before accepting a relationship between Justices’ votes and
presidential or senatorial ideology as statistically significant. This more
difficult test enhances confidence that significance of any relationship
identified in the regression is not distorted by the idiosyncratic voting
patterns of individual Justices.
2.

Time Dummy Variables

A constant measure over time of the relationship between agreement
rates and senatorial ideology may obscure the Senate’s role during distinct
time periods. This study incorporates time dummy variables to identify the
explanatory power of the Senate’s ideology in distinct historical time
periods. The time dummies allow predictive power for presidential and
senatorial ideology to vary across particular time periods.
This study relies on two sets of time dummy variables to evaluate
change over time. The first set groups data into voting records for
Justices appointed during discrete twenty-year time periods. A longer
time period might fail to identify predictive power evident in a limited
number of years, and a smaller time period (or even voting records for
each individual Justice) would rely on samples of underlying data that
are too small to yield statistically significant results. Still, the twenty-year
periods themselves do not line up precisely with events thought to mark
important shifts in the Senate’s role, such as its first-ever use of the
filibuster against Abe Fortas in 1968, or its controversial rejection of
Robert Bork in 1987. The second set of time dummy variables accounts
for this by grouping voting records around the three key events thought
to mark changes in the Senate’s role in the latter part of the twentieth
century.
The first set of time dummy variables break historical voting records
into seven groups. The groups reflect appointments made in distinct
twenty year periods:
Group (1): Before 1890 (Justices Swayne through Brewer);
Group (2): 1890_1910 (Justices Brown through Lurton);
Group (3): 1910_1930 (Justices Hughes through Stone);
171
Group (4): 1930_1950 (Justices Black through Minton);
Group (5): 1950_1970 (Justices Warren through Burger);

171. I begin with Justice Black because Herbert Hoover’s appointees could not be included in the
study. They were excluded because there are no presidential DW-NOMINATE scores for Herbert
Hoover.
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Group (6): 1970_1990 (Justices Blackmun through Kennedy); and
172
Group (7): 1990_2010 (Justices Souter through Sotomayor).

The study uses 0 or 1 dummy variables to identify interaction
between agreement rates and presidential or senatorial ideology for
particular Justices. The first group, Justices appointed from Swayne
through Brewer, does not receive a time dummy variable. This is because
these Justices are used as a baseline from which to compare relationships
in other time periods.
For all later groups, the study codes each dummy variable according
to a single Justice’s paired agreements with all other Justices with whom
he or she sits. For example, the data include agreement rates for
Sotomayor and all other Justices with whom she sits, then agreement
rates for Alito and other Justices with whom he sits, etc. Both Sotomayor
and Alito were appointed during the 1990–2010 period (Group (7)). I
assign a 1 or 0 according to the first Justice in the pair, so that the
Sotomayor and Alito pairs receive a 1 for “1990_2010,” and a 0 for all
other time dummy variables.
The regression multiplies the time dummies for each group by
173
SENDIST and PRESDIST variables. The interaction between these
variables measures whether there is a significant difference between
predictive power of presidential or senatorial ideology over agreement
rates in distinct time periods. Specifically, it compares the relationship
between these variables for Justices in Group (1) to the relationship
between these variables for Justices in a later group whose paired voting
174
records are identified by “1” dummy variables.
The interaction coefficient reported by the regression allows me to
calculate the total predictive power of senatorial or presidential ideology
for a time period covered in Groups (2)–(7), by adding the coefficient for
Group (1) to the interaction coefficient of each Group. (The coefficients
for Group (1) reflect the relationships between ideologies and agreement
rates for Justices appointed during that period; the interaction coefficient

172. The 1962–2009 voting records used for this study do not include Justice Kagan. See supra note
144.
173. See supra note 163.
174. If the effect of distance between presidents or Senates changes for Justices appointed in
certain historical periods, it will show up in the data as a significant coefficient on the interaction
variables. To see this, note that the expected change in agreement rate for a change in presidential
distance is the general PRESDIST coefficient during the time periods when the dummy variable is
equal to zero and the PRESDIST coefficient plus the PRESDIST interaction coefficient during the
time periods that the dummy variable is equal to one. A formal test of the null hypothesis that the
influence of the president did not change is therefore equivalent to a test of the null hypothesis that
the PRESDIST coefficient = PRESDIST coefficient + PRESDIST interaction coefficient, or that the
PRESDIST interaction coefficient = 0.
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reflects the difference in these relationships for Justices appointed during
the later period.) Thus, total predictive power for 1890–1910 equals the
175
sum of interaction coefficients of Group (1) and Group (2). The same
procedure is followed to calculate total levels of predictive power for
Groups (3) through (7). Coefficients reported for distinct time periods
below reflect calculations of total predictive power for the time period
covered by each group.
The study uses another set of time dummy variables to address how
the Senate’s role or the appointments process may have shifted in
response to key events occurring in the latter half of the twentieth
century. Group (A) focuses on Justices appointed before the 1950s, and
Group (B) focuses on Justices appointed after the Senate adopted the
routine practice of asking nominees to appear before the Senate
176
Judiciary Committee. Group (C) focuses on Justices appointed after
the Fortas filibuster, and Group (D) focuses on Justices appointed after
Bork’s failed nomination. If any of these events enhanced the Senate’s
power, one would expect its ideology to have more predictive power over
voting patterns of Justices appointed after they occurred.
Each group reflects paired voting records for the following Justices:
Group (A): Pre-Warren (Justices appointed before Warren)
Group (B): WAR_DUM (Justices Warren through Marshall)
Group (C): FILI_DUM (Justices Burger through Scalia)
Group (D): BORK_DUM (Justices Kennedy through Sotomayor)

Again, Group A does not receive a time dummy variable because it sets
a baseline for comparison to later groups. Time dummy variables for
Groups (B)–(D) reflect the same coding conventions and calculations of
total predictive power above described for the twenty-year time dummy
variables.
3.

Expected Results

As mentioned above, it may be that Justices’ agreement rates reflect
independent voting patterns which cannot be explained by presidential
175. I also needed to calculate new confidence levels for sum of two coefficients. This involved a
multi-step process. First, Variance(a + b) = Variance(a) + Variance (b) + 2*Co-variance(a,b). See
generally Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach 140–41 (2008).
The standard error is the square root of this estimated variance, and the t-stat is (a + b)/SE(a + b).
The t-stat can then be converted into a p-value, reflecting confidence levels reported in this study.
176. Commentators list Harlan’s testimony in 1955 as the precise date of this change. See
Gerhardt, supra note 3, at 68; Wittes, supra note 6, at 64–65; Stone, supra note 5, at 427. However, a
1955 cutoff would require me to exclude Justice Warren and consider an incomplete group of
Eisenhower appointees. Including Warren gives the Senate the benefit of the doubt, as he was a
divided government appointee who disappointed Eisenhower. See Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at
1019 tbl.2. As explained below, even with this favorable presumption the Senate did not increase its
power starting in the 1950s.
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or senatorial ideology. In this case the regression will yield coefficients
that are either zero or statistically indistinguishable from zero for both of
these explanatory variables. In other words, ideologies of nominating
presidents or Senates these presidents face will not predict a significant
change in Justices’ agreement rates.
If either senatorial or presidential ideologies predict rates of
agreement, however, the regression will yield a significant negative
coefficient for the senatorial or presidential variable. The expected
coefficient, or predicted change in agreement rates, is negative for the
following reason: Justices whose votes can be explained by ideologies of
presidents or Senates to which they are nominated will agree less with
Justices whose presidents or Senates are more ideologically distant.
To illustrate, consider what voting patterns one might expect if
either presidential or senatorial ideology predicts rates of agreement. A
presidential ideology explanation holds that a pair of Justices appointed
by close presidents, such as Reagan and George H.W. Bush, will agree at
a high rate, as do Scalia and Thomas. Then, where ideological distance
between presidents is greater, such as distance between Reagan and
Clinton, rates of agreement should be lower, as they are for Scalia and
Ginsburg. If presidential ideology has no predictive power, Justices
appointed by close presidents like Reagan and Bush will agree with one
another about as often as they agree with Justices appointed by distant
presidents like Reagan and Clinton.
Of course, sometimes senatorial ideology has predictive power that
presidential ideology lacks. Stevens, for example, is a Ford appointee
who agreed more with Clinton appointees (Ginsburg and Breyer) than
Reagan appointees (O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy). But the Senate
that confirmed Stevens was just about as liberal as the Senates that
177
confirmed Ginsburg and Breyer. Stevens’ Senate was far more liberal
178
than the Senates that confirmed O’Connor and Scalia. Here, Stevens
agrees less with Justices whose nominating presidents faced Senates that
were more conservative than the one Ford faced in nominating Stevens.
Senatorial ideology explains Stevens’ voting patterns. If senatorial
ideology has no predictive power, however, then Justices like Stevens will
agree with Justices like Ginsburg and Breyer about as much as they agree
with Justices like O’Connor and Scalia.
Finally, regression analysis accounts for pairs of Justices whose
presidents or Senates have identical scores, and thus a PRESDIST or a
179
SENDIST of zero. This is because agreement rates for these pairs are
177. See Justices Database, supra note 29.
178. Id. And it was somewhat more liberal than the Senate to which Kennedy was nominated. Id.
179. There are sixty-eight Justice pairs with a SENDIST of zero and 160 Justice pairs with a
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always compared to agreement rates of other pairs for whom PRESDIST
or SENDIST is greater than zero. Assume nominations where a
conservative president faces a very liberal Senate (Stevens) and a liberal
president faces to an almost equally liberal Senate (Ginsburg). Even if
Stevens’ and Ginsburg’s presidents faced identical Senates with a
SENDIST of zero, their percentages of agreement factor into the
relationship reported by the regression. The Senate would have
explanatory power over Stevens’ voting, for example, if he agreed with
Ginsburg and others like her (Breyer) more than other Justices
nominated by conservative presidents facing conservative Senates (such
as O’Connor and Reagan or Alito and Roberts).
F.

Results

As illustrated by Figure 1, the initial regression shows that senatorial
ideology fails to significantly predict Justices’ rates of agreement.
Presidential ideology, on the other hand, has significant predictive power
over Justices’ rates of agreement.

PRESDIST of zero. Every time SENDIST is zero, PRESDIST is also zero. There were some times
where the same president faced different Senates throughout his time in office, leading to a
PRESDIST of zero with a SENDIST of more than zero.
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Figure 1: Predictive Power of Presidential and
180
Senatorial Ideology over Agreement Rates

The results fail to support my first hypothesis. Holding presidential
ideology fixed, Justices whose presidents faced ideologically proximate
Senates do not agree significantly more than Justices whose presidents
faced ideologically distant Senates. The standard error is too great to
confidently identify a relationship between agreement rates and senatorial
ideology, and the relationship is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Thus, senatorial ideology fails to significantly predict how Justices vote.

180. Estimated with all Justices appointed from Swayne through Sotomayor (and for whom
nominating presidents have DW-NOMINATE scores). *** denotes a 1% confidence level, and the white
bar denotes results statistically indistinguishable from zero. Confidence levels are calculated using
clustered standard errors; for an explanation of confidence levels, see supra note 161. Change in
agreement rates is predicted difference in agreement rates per 1 unit of difference in presidential DWNOMINATE scores and per 0.1 unit of difference in senatorial DW-NOMINATE scores. N=969.
The study reports change in agreement rates per 1 unit of difference in presidential DWNOMINATE scores and per 0.1 unit of difference in senatorial DW-NOMINATE scores. These different
scales reflect the fact that differences in scores for median Senators fluctuate within a much smaller range,
0.619 to zero, than differences in scores for nominating presidents, which range from 1.44 to zero. For
example, ideologically distant presidents may have DW-NOMINATE scores about one unit apart (as
noted above, Clinton and Ford were 1.14 units apart). Spreads for the Senate are never this large. The
very different Senates to which Stevens and Scalia were nominated, for example, have median Senators
with scores of -0.188 and -0.014, respectively. Thus their scores are only 0.174 units apart. See Justices
Database, supra note 29.
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Presidential ideology, on the other hand, predicts a significant
negative change in agreement rates. One can be highly confident, at the
181
1% level, that this relationship is not merely the product of random
variation in voting patterns. There is strong evidence that, on average,
Justices nominated by ideologically proximate presidents vote together
at higher rates than those appointed by ideologically distant presidents.
This result shows that ideological proximity of nominating presidents
has significant predictive power over Justices’ votes, while ideological
distance between Senates does not have the same significant
182
relationship. It is consistent with findings suggesting lack of senatorial
183
constraint in my earlier work. And it fails to support a general
understanding of senatorial constraint across the entire time period.
Results for the second regression add nuance by considering the
predictive power of the Senate and president’s ideology in distinct time
periods. Because the overall results show that presidential ideology has
more significant predictive power than senatorial ideology, the regression
results are first presented showing the president’s role in distinct time
periods. The associations between presidential ideology and Justices’
agreement rates provide a helpful baseline from which to consider results
for the Senate.
Figure 2 shows that presidential ideology did not significantly predict
Justices’ agreement rates in any period before 1970. But after 1970, the
president’s ideology maintained significant predictive power over
agreement rates.
One of the most striking results, consistent with the overall findings
above, is that the president’s ideology gained predictive power over time.
184
In the first five historical periods, spanning years 1862–1970, the
185
predictive power of the president’s ideology is statistically insignificant.
181. For an explanation of confidence levels, see supra note 161.
182. I ran a separate regression to account for the possibility that filibusters may lead presidents to
select Justices closer to the filibuster pivot (currently the sixtieth-most liberal or conservative Senator)
than to the Senate median. As reported in Appendix A: Alternative Measure of Senatorial Ideology,
infra, this measure also fails to identify senatorial influence.
183. Chabot & Chabot, supra note 8, at 1019 tbl.2.
184. The Judges of 1925 changed the Court’s jurisdiction in ways that allowed it to hear a greater
percentage of politically divisive cases than before. See generally Halpern & Vines, supra note 144. It
may be that this change in the menu of cases before the Court, rather than enhanced ability of
presidents or Senates to seat ideologically compatible Justices, led to political voting patterns
identified here. In this case, however, the post-1925 changes in jurisdiction do not offer a likely
explanation for the study’s results. Presidential ideology did not gain significant explanatory power
over Justices’ votes until many decades after 1925. Further, as explained below, any gains in the
predictive power of Senatorial ideology around this time vanished by the 1950s. Thus, changes in
politically predictable voting do not seem to have occurred around the same time the Court’s
jurisdiction changed.
185. Although the predicted change in agreement for 1930–1950 seems large (-0.105), the standard
error surrounding this finding (0.0763) is also too large to be confident that the predicted change is not
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But the coefficient showing predictive power of presidential ideology
then increases to negative 7% after 1970 and negative 11% after 1990.
These levels of predictive power in the latter periods are significantly
different than zero at the standard 5% confidence level. One can
confidently reject the null hypothesis that presidential ideology is
unrelated to agreement rates for these periods.
Figure 2: Predictive Power of Presidential Ideology for
186
Agreement Rates over Time (Twenty-Year Time Dummy Variables)

The enhanced predictive power coincides with a period where
Nixon and Reagan prioritized ideology in their appointments to the
187
bench. Although in the 1990s, Bush and Clinton may not have placed
the same emphasis on ideology, by this point they may have been better
able to predict how their nominees would vote. Like the Reagan
administration, they had access to enhanced technology allowing them to
188
find and analyze nominees’ past writings using computerized databases.

in fact zero. See infra Appendix B.
186. Estimated with all Justices appointed from Swayne through Sotomayor (and for whom
nominating presidents have DW-NOMINATE scores). ** denotes a 5% confidence level, and white
bars denote results statistically indistinguishable from zero. Confidence levels are calculated using
clustered standard errors. Change in agreement rates is predicted difference in agreement rates per 1
unit of difference in presidential DW-NOMINATE scores. N=969.
187. See Yalof, supra note 14, at 169–70.
188. See supra note 138 and surrounding discussion.
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Figure 3: Predictive Power of Senatorial Ideology for Agreement
189
Rates over Time (Twenty-Year Time Dummy Variables)

Given evidence that presidential ideology has become a significant
predictor of Justices’ agreement rates since 1970, the remaining questions
are whether the Senate’s role evolved along a similar timeline and whether
the Senate held its ground against an increasingly powerful executive.
Figure 3 shows a strong association between senatorial ideology and
agreement rates during certain historical and recent periods. But it also
shows that the Senate’s ideology has not consistently maintained
significant predictive power over time, and that its predictive power was
statistically indistinguishable from zero for Justices appointed after 1990.
Predictive power of the Senate’s ideology is statistically
indistinguishable from zero before 1890, and it gains some significance
from 1890–1910. Lack of more significant power before 1910 may seem
surprising, given accounts of an aggressive Senate in the nineteenth
190
century. It may be that confirmation politics in the nineteenth century
191
turned on the parochial concerns of individual Senators and that those
189. Estimated with all Justices appointed from Swayne through Sotomayor (and for whom
nominating presidents have DW-NOMINATE scores). ** denotes a 5% confidence level, * denotes a
10% confidence level, and white bars denote results statistically indistinguishable from zero. Confidence
levels are calculated using clustered standard errors. Change in agreement rates is predicted difference in
agreement rates per 0.1 unit of difference in senatorial DW-NOMINATE scores.
190. See Whittington, supra note 35, at 430–33.
191. See id. at 430–31 (noting the role played by “claims of prerogative of individual senators” in
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views are not well reflected in Senate medians used to measure senatorial
192
ideology. Also, the pre-1890 time period excludes five appointees
because there are no presidential DW-NOMINATE scores for these
Justices. As explained in Part III.C, one cannot reliably measure
predictive power of senatorial ideology without considering presidential
ideology at the same time.
In any event, things changed markedly from 1910–1930, as the
Senate’s ideology significantly predicted change in agreement rates of
Justices appointed during this period. This supports my second hypothesis
of predictive power in a distinct historical period. It is consistent with
Epstein and Segal’s account of a historically aggressive Senate, as reflected
in events such as the pitched political battle over Louis Brandeis’
confirmation in 1916.
The Senate’s ideology did not maintain its significance. Although its
predictive power is indistinguishable from zero by the 1930–1950 period,
this period again reflects an incomplete set of Justices. It does not include
voting records for Owen Roberts (appointed in 1930) and Benjamin
Cardozo (appointed in 1932) because there are no presidential DW193
NOMINATE scores available for these Justices. Hoover nominated
Roberts after the Senate rejected his earlier nomination of John Parker,
and he faced senatorial pressure to select Cardozo to replace the vacancy
194
left by Oliver Wendell Holmes. Thus, analysis based on more complete
data might show a different result.
In any event, results for the 1950–1970 time period include all
appointees, and they offer no reason to think the Senate’s ideology
maintained any of its earlier significance. Indeed, the Senate coefficient
for this time period is not only indistinguishable from zero, but it is
positive. This suggests that, if anything, Justices whose presidents faced
ideologically distant Senates voted together more than Justices whose
presidents faced ideologically proximate Senates. Thus, voting records
provide no evidence of senatorial constraint in the period post-Brown
where the Senate adopted a routine practice of grilling nominees about
195
This result does not support my third
their substantive views.
hypothesis that the Senate’s ideology gained predictive power from
1950–1970. It offers no reason to think that more aggressive confirmation
nineteenth-century confirmation politics).
192. L.Q. Lamar, Fuller, Matthews, Woods, and Harlan I.
193. Presidential DW-NOMINATE scores for Hoover’s first appointee, Chief Justice Charles
Evan Hughes, are based on Hughes’ initial appointment by President William Taft.
194. See Bernard Schwartz, A History of the Supreme Court 228–29 (1993); see also Henry J.
Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and Senators: A History of the U.S. Supreme Court Appointments
from Washington to Bush II 153–54 (5th ed. 2008).
195. See Wittes, supra note 6, at 61.
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practices drove presidents to better accommodate the Senate’s policy
preferences in nomination decisions.
But the Senate’s ideology again displayed enhanced significance by
the 1970s. Here the Senate’s predicted change in agreement rates has a
negative coefficient that is significantly different than zero at the 5%
confidence level. Ideological proximity between Senates predicts
agreement rates for Justices appointed during this time period. On
average, Justices nominated by presidents facing ideologically proximate
Senates voted together more than Justices whose presidents faced Senates
that were far apart.
This result supports my fourth hypothesis of an enhanced predictive
power starting in the 1970s. It is consistent with accounts describing how
a more politicized appointments process emerged by the late 1960s. For
example, Silverstein describes this time period as one with change
wrought by increased political pressures stemming from the changing
nature of judicial power and the involvement of powerful interest
196
groups. Formal interest group participation in confirmation hearings
197
started to become a staple by the Fortas filibuster in 1968. Senators
also operated under new norms where it was no longer safe to simply
198
conform to the expectations of peers and accept the president’s choice.
Instead, each Senator now faced significant electoral consequences in
199
voting for or against a particular nominee.
The Senate’s ideology gained significance at a time when
commentators assert the Senate assumed a more aggressive and politicized
200
role in confirmation proceedings. Davis states that calls “for Senate
assertiveness in the nomination process began with Republican Senators
during the unsuccessful confirmation effort for Abe Fortas as chief justice
201
in 1968.” The Senate went on to reject Nixon’s nominations of Clement
202
Haynsworth, Jr., and G. Harrold Carswell. Silverstein posits that this
more aggressive role compelled presidents to choose nominees who would
203
minimize political opposition to their confirmation. And indeed, for
Justices nominated immediately after these actions, agreement rates
reflect the ideology of Senates faced by nominating presidents.

196. Silverstein, supra note 72, at 153–54.
197. See Nemacheck, supra note 20, at 48 (citing Jeffrey A. Segal et al., A Spatial Model of Roll
Call Voting: Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations,
36 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 96 (1992)).
198. Silverstein, supra note 72, at 152–56.
199. Id.
200. See id. at 12.
201. Davis, supra note 33, at 20–21.
202. Supreme Court Nominations, supra note 7.
203. See Silverstein, supra note 72, at 100.
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Most surprising, however, are results for the most recent time period,
1990 through 2010. Though the regression still predicts a decrease in
agreement rates as distances between senatorial ideology increase, the
coefficient on the predicted change shrinks dramatically. The error
surrounding this finding is too great to be confident that the Senate’s true
predictive power is not zero. Thus, the regression fails to support my fifth
hypothesis that the Senate’s ideology had predictive power from 1990–
2010 or after its rejection of Robert Bork in 1987. It does not allow one
to confidently conclude that the Senate’s ideology maintained the
significant predictive power it had in the 1970s. If presidents continued
taking senatorial ideology into account, this practice did not manifest
itself in appointees with voting records which significantly reflected the
Senate’s ideology.
These results are consistent with observations that the Senate’s
204
rejection of Bork was a one-time success that could not be repeated. To
be sure, rejecting Bork had short run benefits and kept at least one
extreme candidate off the Court. But in the long run the Senate’s
controversial strategy may have backfired. Future nominees had
tremendous incentives to avoid being as forthcoming as Bork at
confirmation hearings. The event may have also raised the political
stakes and fortified the resolve of powerful executives—whose ideology
maintained a significant level of predictive power after the 1990s.
Still, the fixed twenty-year time periods considered above may not
adequately capture appointments occurring immediately after events
such as the Fortas filibuster or Bork’s rejection. My final regression
accounts for this possibility by using a second set of time dummy
variables. These variables break data into different time periods
reflecting three key events thought to mark significant shifts in the
Senate’s role since the 1950s: (1) the Senate’s routine requirement that
nominees appear before the Senate Judiciary Committee starting in the
1950s, (2) the Senate’s first ever use of the filibuster against a Supreme
Court nominee—Fortas for Chief Justice—in 1968, and (3) Bork’s failed
nomination.
The results, however, echo my earlier findings. Presidential ideology
has some predictive power after the Fortas filibuster, and it gains
significant predictive power after the Senate’s rejection of Bork. The
Senate’s ideology gains significant predictive power after the Fortas
filibuster but again fails to maintain its significance post-Bork.

204. See generally Eisgruber, supra note 11; Kagan, supra note 126.
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Figure 4: Predictive Power of Presidential Ideology for
205
Agreement Rates over Time (Event Time Dummy Variables)

Figure 5: Predictive Power of Senatorial Ideology for
206
Agreement Rates over Time (Event Time Dummy Variables)

205. Both charts report the result of a single regression calculated for all Justices appointed from
Swayne through Sotomayor (and for whom nominating presidents have DW-NOMINATE scores).
* denotes a 10% confidence level, *** denotes a 1% confidence level, and the white bars denote
results statistically indistinguishable from zero. Confidence levels are calculated using clustered
standard errors. Change in agreement rates is predicted difference in agreement rates per 1 unit of
difference in presidential DW-NOMINATE scores and per 0.1 unit of difference in senatorial DWNOMINATE scores. N=969.
206. See supra note 205.
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Conclusion
Overall, the Senate’s ideology has had little predictive power over
the voting behavior of Justices it confirms. Presidential ideology, on the
other hand, significantly predicts agreement rates across all 969 pairs of
Justices. Although the Senate’s ideology significantly predicted Justices’
agreements during two isolated historical periods, it never maintained a
consistent level of predictive power over time.
Analysis of an extended historical period shows that votes cast by
earlier Justices were not completely unrelated to political forces
surrounding their appointments. Senatorial ideology had some predictive
power over agreement rates of Justices appointed from 1890–1910, and it
had significant predictive power over agreement rates of Justices
appointed from 1910–1930. But the association between senatorial
ideology and Justices’ agreement rates did not persist over time.
Any gains the Senate made from 1910–1930 were no longer evident
by the 1950s. And although the Senate’s ideology regained significant
predictive power after the Fortas filibuster and through the early 1980s, it
again lost significance after Bork’s rejection in 1987. These findings
substantially qualify earlier accounts of senatorial constraint.
Taken together, enhanced predictive power of presidential and
senatorial ideology support the theory that the appointments process has
become more effectively politicized in recent decades. The 1970s were
the first time both presidential and senatorial ideology significantly
explained Justices’ voting patterns.
Mounting political pressures placed the Supreme Court appointments
process in an unprecedented spotlight by the time the Senate rejected
207
Robert Bork in 1987. Voting records of subsequent appointees show that
presidents generally persisted in efforts to select ideologically compatible
Justices. Presidents did not continue, however, to select Justices whose
agreement rates significantly reflected the Senate’s ideology.
These results are consistent with observations that the Senate’s
208
rejection of Bork was a one-time success that could not be repeated.
The Senate’s primary weapon, aggressive questioning at confirmation
hearings, may have been dismantled by evasive nominees who wanted to
209
avoid being “Borked.” The Senate has deployed other weapons, such as
210
delay, to block lower court nominations. But these additional weapons
207. Maltese, supra note 116, at 7; Yalof, supra note 14, at 160 (“The Bork nomination became a
watershed in terms of interest group involvement in the appointment process.”); see Binder &
Maltzman, supra note 6, at 7–8 (noting this position); Wittes, supra note 6, at 21 (same).
208. Eisgruber, supra note 11, at 156.
209. Id.
210. Binder & Maltzman, supra note 6, at 5, 16.
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are not as readily available to Senators who wish to oppose highly
211
publicized nominations to the Supreme Court.
Presidents, by comparison, faced the political, post-Bork confirmation
environment with the benefit of new technological resources:
Computerized databases allowed presidential aides to quickly assemble
212
and analyze virtually all of a nominee’s past writings. This improved
information may have better enabled presidents and their staff to
anticipate not only questions at confirmation hearings, but also the
nominee’s likely rulings once on the bench. Further, the decision to choose
nominees almost exclusively from a pool of candidates with prior judicial
213
experience may have helped presidents exploit this technology to even
greater advantage.
The voting records of Justices nominated in this most recent period
show the Senate has not deterred presidents from appointing Justices
who reflect presidential ideology. These records fail to identify an
equally significant role for the Senate in presidents’ choices of nominees.
Despite the Senate’s power to keep a limited group of nominees off the
Court, it ultimately failed to constrain presidents to nominate Justices
who significantly reflected the Senate’s ideology.

Appendix A: Alternative Measure of Senatorial Ideology
The results presented in Part III show that the distance between
median members of the Senate at time of nomination does not generally
predict agreement levels between pairs of Justices. It is still possible that
a metric other than distance between median Senators will establish
senatorial power.
For example, perhaps the president is more concerned about
overcoming a filibuster than winning a simple majority of votes. A
filibuster gives weight to vocal minority interests in the Senate, and thus
it may lead a president to nominate more moderate candidates even
though his party controls the Senate. To secure confirmation in the face
of a filibuster, the president needs to win votes of a supermajority,
allowing the Senate to invoke cloture and bring the nomination to a vote.
This might lead the president to select a nominee who is closer to the
filibuster pivot or last Senator whose vote will secure cloture. In the
modern Senate, this is the sixtieth-most liberal or conservative Senator.

211. Id. at 2 (stating that “lower court” nominations are considered “out of the public spotlight”
and thus give opposing Senators a “far easier time” blocking nominations “surreptitiously by
exploiting the Senate’s formal rules and informal practices”).
212. Yalof, supra note 14, at 17 (discussing advances in legal research technology available to
“[a]ll modern participants in the appointment process”).
213. See generally George, supra note 141.
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If this is in fact the president’s concern, distance between filibuster pivots
may have more predictive value than distance between median Senators.
There is an additional regression exploring this possibility below.
This additional measure, however, still fails to identify senatorial
influence beyond what is found in the initial specifications.
To calculate historical filibuster pivot scores, the study accounts for
different voting rules the Senate has used over time. The Senate did not
even have Rule 22, which allows a supermajority to invoke cloture and
214
end debate, until 1917. Thus, this regression only uses voting pairs in
which both Justices were appointed after Rule 22 (Justices Taft and
beyond). Cloture required a two-thirds majority vote from 1917 through
215
1975 and, after that, a three-fifths majority of all Senators duly chosen
216
and sworn.
The filibuster pivot is calculated based on the DW-NOMINATE
217
score of the Senator needed to secure the appropriate supermajority
vote at the time of a Justice’s nomination. The regression uses the
absolute distance between these filibuster pivots as the independent
variable measuring the Senate’s ideology. As before, a multivariate
regression is run, which considers and isolates the effects properly
attributable to distinct independent variables: (1) distance between
218
presidents’ DW-NOMINATE scores and (2) distance between DWNOMINATE scores for the filibuster pivots at time of nomination.

214. Filibuster and Cloture, U.S. Senate, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/
briefing/Filibuster_Cloture.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
215. Rules for calculating the two-thirds majority also fluctuated between Senators duly chosen,
sworn, present, and voting during this time period. See generally Martin B. Gold & Dimple Gupta, The
Constitutional Option to Change Senate Rules and Procedures: A Majoritarian Means to Overcome the
Filibuster, 28 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 206, 226–47 (2004). The study drew a bright line and calculated
two-thirds based on the entire membership of the Senate for my time period.
216. Filibuster and Cloture, supra note 214.
217. Scores for each Senator are available in Carroll et al., supra note 30 (Sept. 2011 version).
218. Here scores for presidents were drawn from the same release of DW-NOMINATE scores
used to calculate filibuster pivots.
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Figure 6: Predictive Power of Presidential Ideology and
219
Ideology of Senate Filibuster Pivot over Agreement Rates

Again this fails to show evidence of senatorial power. Although the
point estimate (-0.03) suggests that the filibuster pivot has some
predictive power over votes, the error surrounding both coefficients is
too great to be confident that they are not, in fact, zero.

219. (Agree_Rate)i,j = i + 1*(PRESDIST)+2*(SENFILIDIST) + . Estimated with all Justices
appointed from Taft through Sotomayor (and for whom nominating presidents have DWNOMINATE scores). Confidence levels are calculated using clustered standard errors, and white bars
denote results statistically indistinguishable from zero. N=536. For a list of excluded Justices, see supra
note 147.
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Appendix B: Summary of Regression Results
Explanatory Variable
PresDist

1

.1
Change
SenDist

-0.0596***
[0.0224]

2

.1
Change
SenDist

-0.0309
[0.0375]
0.0408
[0.0282]
0.091
[0.0614]
-0.105
[0.0763]
-0.0533
[0.0667]
-0.0763**
[0.0379]
-0.1124**
[0.0444]

PresDist 1890–1910
PresDist 1910–30
PresDist 1930–50
PresDist 1950–70
PresDist 1970–1990
PresDist 1990–2010

PresDist Post-Filibuster
PresDist Post Bork
-0.0384
[0.0568]

-0.00384

-0.018
[0.0601]

.1
Change
SenDist

-0.0173
[0.0294]

PresDist Post-Warren

SenDist

3

-0.0018

-0.0394
[0.0743]
-0.0773*
[0.04049]
-0.1109***
[0.0353]
-0.0835
[0.0556]

-0.059
[0.0524]

-0.00835

SenDist (Filibuster Pivot)

-0.0394
[0.0491]

SenDist 1890–1910

-0.1195*
[0.0627]
-0.32**
[0.1567]
-0.0822
[0.21]
0.197
[0.1525]
-0.4214**
[0.2022]
-0.1836
[0.2759]

SenDist 1910–30
SenDist 1930–50
SenDist 1950–70
SenDist 1970–1990
SenDist 1990–2010
SenDist Post-Warren

0.1533
969

-0.032
-0.00822
0.0197
-0.4214
-0.1836

0.1724
969

969

SenDist Post Bork
Adj. R2d

-0.01195

0.236
[0.1530]
-0.6306***
[0.1395]
-0.1334
[0.2422]
0.1711

SenDist Post-Filibuster

N

4

0.0236
-0.06306
-0.01334
0.1566
536

Clustered standard errors are reported in brackets. Values for time
interaction coefficients (and accompanying standard errors) reflect the
total level of predicted change in agreement rates for appointees of a
given time period. Senate coefficients reported per 0.1 unit in distance
between DW-NOMINATE scores are noted to the left of coefficients
per 1 unit of distance.
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Column 1 reports results for Figure 1, Column 2 reports results for
221
222
223
224
Figures 2 and 3, Column 3 reports results for Figures 4 and 5, and
225
Column 4 reports results for Figure 6. * denotes a 10% confidence level,
** denotes a 5% confidence level, and *** denotes a 1% confidence level.

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

See supra note 180.
See supra note 186.
See supra note 189.
See supra note 205.
See supra note 206.
See supra note 219.

